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ABSTRACT
Machine Learning (ML) has already been integrated into all kinds
of systems, helping developers to solve problems with even higher
accuracy than human beings. However, when implementing a sys-
tem with ML model embedded, developers may accidentally take
not enough care of the outputs of ML models, resulting in severe
consequences like hurting data owners’ privacy. Specifically for
face authentication systems, we show that profile photos can be
recovered once the system shows similarity (distance) to users.
In this work, we focus on understanding the risks of leaking
distances of faces calculated by face recognition models. To show
the consequence, we reveal several kinds of scenarios in which
distances are accidentally leaked. E.g., a face verification system de-
ployed by a government organization leaks similarity to attackers.
Further, as we firstly identified, with leaked distances, attackers
can easily recover the victim’s face embedding in the authenti-
cation database, when using our proposed method. Threaten is
that the profile photo corresponding to the embedding can then
be recovered, indicating devastating consequences to authentica-
tion system security and users’ privacy. This is achieved with our
devised GAN-like model, which showed 93.65% success rate on
popular face embedding model.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning (ML) gained a great success because of its high
accuracy and convenience to implement. ML outperforms both
human beings and traditional logic based programs for a lot of
problems, like face recognition, board game etc., which convinces
people to confidently integrate ML models to various applications.
Apart from high accuracy, ML is easy to implement, which also
contributed to its popularity. Usually a deep learningmodel costs de-
velopers several hundreds of Python codes but can already produce
satisfied accuracy.
Face recognition (FR) benefit a lot from ML and are employed by
numerous real world systems, but FR techniques are also blamed for
privacy issues. With recent deep learning techniques involved, face
embedding, the supporting technique behind FR, harvested a big
step forward in terms of accuracy, which realized applications like
face authentication, face search etc.. As these applications became
popular, huge amount of face photos are processed by FR. With
no doubt, these photos are highly sensitive and should be never
exposed to unauthorized people. Therefore, researchers started
their work around privacy leakages resulted from FR. To avoid
potential privacy invasion, San Francisco even banned the use of
FR techniques. However, the privacy concerns didn’t impede the
popularity of FR and related applications.
FR techniques may unintentionally leak users’ face photo when
deployed in face authentication systems, as we firstly identified.
To show the severeness, in this work, we demonstrate a kind of
attack that targets face authentication systems. The attack allows
an attacker to pass authentication and even steal profile photos
of all users of a face authentication system, although actually au-
thentication systems do not store any photo for users. The attack
is not a result of bugs of a specific family of ML models but stems
from leakages of face comparisons. The attack bases on three in-
sights we identified in face recognition powered authentication
systems: 1) Even a failed authentication result leaks information to
attackers. 2) The information can be accumulated so that the face
embedding, internal representation of a user, can be recovered. 3)
The face embedding is as equal sensitive as the original face photo,
because an attacker can easily recover the photo when she acquires
an embedding.
Information leakage during face authentication. Every time
face authentication is launched, the system leaks a small portion
information about the claimed user’s face to the prover via the com-
parison results, which could help attackers to recover the embed-
ding (a vector representing a face) of the profile photo once enough
information is collected. Specifically, the leakage results from the
similarity attached in verification results. As we noticed, when
implementing face authentication systems, developers sometimes
show the similarity from the prover to the claimed user besides
telling if face matched. The similarity actually leaks a small portion
of information about the claimed user no matter if the prover is
indeed the claimed user.
Embedding recovery with information leakage. At the first
glance, exposing the similarity to users would not result in pro-
file photo leakage, as the amount of information provided by the
similarity is negligible comparing with the amount of information
a profile photo. However, the information in different rounds of
authentication can be accumulated, when the attacker actively try
to launch authentication with different provers. When enough in-
formation is collected, as we will later show, an attacker can readily
recover the embedding of the victim’s profile photo, mainly be-
cause embeddings are actually high-dimension vectors which still
obey algebraic geometry theorems. Therefore each authentication
result signals the attacker an equation about the embedding. When
enough amount of equations about the embedding are acquired,
the attacker can work the embedding out.
Photo recovery with embedding.What’s worse is that with the
embedding of a victim’s photo, the attacker can recover the profile
photo with a GAN-like recovery model proposed by us. The em-
bedding of a profile photo is generated by a deep learning model
which is deemed to be super non-linear and hard to interpret. There-
fore, to the best of our knowledge, there is no tool or algorithm
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to help attackers to get the reverse mapping of a deep learning
model. Besides, the embedding process is generally a lossy function
from higher input dimension to lower output dimension, so the
reversing is theoretically difficult because of the lost information
during mapping. As a result, there is no straightforward method to
reverse a face embedding to its original profile photo.
After analyzing the face embedding model structure, we propose
a deep learning model that maps face embeddings back to profile
photos. The model tries to get back information lost during em-
bedding with the help of GAN. The recovery model has a GAN
like structure and produces satisfied recovery quality. Unlike GAN
generators that map noises to data with given distribution, our
recovery model, though also has a generator, tries to get a reverse
mapping of a face embedding model, which is more challenging
than training a normal GAN, because We need the model generates
not only authentic face images but also face images corresponding
to the embedding the attacker recovered. To force the GAN genera-
tor to generate embedding-face corresponded mapping, we devise a
series of loss functions and special training process. As a result, the
recovery quality is very high. An evaluation metric is that 93.75% of
the generated photos are recognized as from the embedding owner
by the face embedding model.
The consequence of the face recovery is devastating. Take a
face authentication based door entrance system of a building as an
example, an attacker can claim to be arbitrary one of the legitimate
tenant (victim) and try to pass the entrance with the recovered
victim face. More severely, the method eventually can help attackers
dump the whole profile photo database of the system. Theoretically,
the attacker can enumerate all tenant ID and repeat the attack.
Threatening is that the attacker knows nothing about the victim in
this case.
To avoid any further embedding leakages, we suggest that ML
library developers must clearly state in the documents that the em-
bedding is as equal sensitive as original image. Also, any distance or
similarity calculated with embeddings should not be freely exposed
to users or third parties. Beside, we suggest ML researchers design
embedding models that cannot be easily reversed, i.e. one-way ML
model.
We summarize our contributions as follow:
• We identified that face authentication developers may leak
a small portion information about the claimed user when
showing distances (similarities) from the prover to the
claimed user.
• We show that such information can be collected to recover
the embedding of the claimed user. To show the feasibility,
we construct an equation set to help attackers work out
the claimed user’s embedding with query embeddings and
leaked distances.
• We discovered that an embedding is as equal sensitive as
the behind profile photo.
• We designed a GAN-like recovery model to map face em-
beddings back to profile photos.With themodel we showed
that the recovery model can be applied to all the popular
FR models we evaluated.
2 BACKGROUND
We introduce some background techniques that will be used in this
work.
2.1 Face Embedding
Face embedding is simply a mapping (y = f (x)) from the image (x )
space to the vector space (y). The mapping could be useless unless
important properties on x also holds on y. Usually, people expect
the similarity of embeddings is proportional to similarity of faces,
so that the similarity of a pair of faces can be directly calculated by
calculating the similarity of their embeddings (1- their distance).
With face embedding, a lot of tasks related to faces can be easy to
implement. For example, face searching becomes to similar vector
searching problem for which there are already tons of algorithms,
like Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH [7]). Another example could
be face verification: tell if two faces are from the same person. With
face embedding, developers need only check if the distance between
the two embeddings exceeds a pre-defined threshold.
2.2 GAN
Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) [8] aims at synthesizing
data of similar distribution to training data. Usually, GANs are used
to generate photos that look authentic to human beings.
GAN structure. GANs usually come with two parts: a generator
and a discriminator. The generator maps noises to the target space,
while the discriminator determines if a given piece of data is au-
thentic or synthesized (generated). During training, the generator
is encouraged to fool the discriminator, i.e. improve its generation
capability, while the discriminator is forced to tell authentic and
synthesized data apart, i.e. improve its discrimination capability.
Starting from random parameters, the generator has no ability to
generate authentic data and the discriminator neither has ability to
tell apart synthesized data. They are trained in turn to defeat each
other, i.e. have stronger capability than the other. With training
process goes on, the two capabilities gradually increase in turn. As
a result, the generator has strong enough generation capability to
even fool human beings.
Conditional GAN (cGAN) [6]. Early GANs had no control over
the generated data. However people wanted to generate data not
only falling to a specific distribution but also with given attributes.
To satisfy these demands, cGAN was proposed. In cGANs, the
generator takes as input not only noises but also a given label,
indicating generating data falling to the distribution of a specific
class. Similarly, the discriminator also gets the label and tells if the
input data are in the distribution and at the same time go with the
class. As a result, the generator can generate data of the given label.
There are also a bunch of famous GAN variant works, like image
to image translation [12], image to image translation without paired
data [25].
2.3 PCA and SVD
Principal component analysis (PCA) is a statistical tool to transform
possibly correlated data into linearly uncorrelated variables (princi-
pal components). With the decomposed uncorrelated components,
analysts can check the variance (importance) of each components
2
and then try to compress the data by omitting those components
with only little variance. Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) is
a popular method to do PCA over matrices. In SVD, am-by-n ma-
trixM where each row is a piece of n dimension observation and
totallym observations can be decomposed to the product of three
matrices, i.e. M = U · Σ · V ⊺ , in which U and V ⊺ are unitary ma-
trices and Σ being a rectangular diagonal matrix. When M is not a
square matrix, say, whenm > n,U will bem-by-n, Σ being n-by-n
and V being n-by-n. Each row of V here is a component and the
value corresponded in the diagonal of Σ represents the variance
of the component. Because U and V ⊺ are unitary, each column
of U or each row of V will be orthogonal, indicating orthogonal
components. People usually makes the diagonal of σ in descending
order.
When doing PCA, analysts usually want to approximateM with
another matrix M˜ that has a lower rank, which can be done with
SVD by truncatingU , Σ andV . To have a rank r M˜ , we can truncate
the matrices intom-by-r , r -by-r and n-by-r , from top to down and
from left to right. Because Σ has descending order diagonal, the trun-
cated dimensions have less variance. As a result, a n dimensional
row vector in M can actually be represented as a r dimensional
vector with acceptable errors.
3 OVERVIEW & ADVERSARY MODEL
We firstly briefly introduce the attack model and then discuss the
capabilities we assume for the adversaries.
3.1 Attack Overview
The attacker aims at acquiring a profile photo of the target vic-
tim who is a user of a face authentication system. The attacker is
interested in the profile photo because 1) She is interested in the
privacy of the victim or 2) She wants to use the photo to pass the
face authentication system on the behalf of the victim.
To achieve this, the attacker comes to the face authentication
system that the victim already enrolled. She claims to be the victim
by entering the ID of victim and then face authentication is started.
She presents the system either a profile photo or a real person,
depending on whether the system comes with a liveness detection
system, but anyway obviously she cannot pass the authentication
and the authentication system return to the attacker an authen-
tication failure notice as well as the similarity that is below the
threshold. The attacker records the photo causing the failure and
the returned similarity, so she gets a <photo, similarity> pair. The
attacker repeats this process several times with different provers,
i.e. different photos or different people. As a result, she gets a list
of <photo, similarity> pairs.
With the list of <photo, similarity> pairs, the attacker can then
1) firstly recover the embedding of the victim’s face according to
our embedding recovery method, and then send the embedding to
the GAN-like recovery model for image recovery.
3.2 Embedding Model Assumptions
Our later introduced attack method needs the involvement of em-
bedding model inside the authentication system. In this section, we
introduce our different assumptions about the embedding model
the attacker can acquire. Our later method works with these as-
sumptions differently.
White Box adversaries. Most of times, the attacker knows the
target model in detail, including structure, hyper-parameters and
weights. In this scenarios, she is expected to recover images with
better quality. We call this kind of adversary white box adversary.
An attacker may have multiple ways to acquire the model. For
example, she can purchase or download for free the same face
authentication software as the target system, and then reverse
engineer the software to extract the model out. Reverse engineering
indeed costs the attacker much effort but she needs only solve it
once for all. According to our discussion with face recognition
system engineers, over 80% main stream face recognition solutions
come from the top 10 CV companies, including SenseTime and
Megvii etc. In this case, attackers can identify which model is used
and then get exactly the same model by purchasing from these AI
solution companies. Besides, it would be easy if the system comes
with open source face recognition library like Open face [2]. In
fact open source solutions already provide enough precision. If
the system uses open source library, the attacker can then directly
download and extract the model out after having identified which
library is used.
Black Box Adversaries. Some adversaries do not know the model
in detail but can querying the model, in which case we call them
black box adversaries.
Sometimes, extracting the model out from the software could be
difficult, but exposing the interface for specific functions could be
easy. If an adversary only gets the interface for embedding but could
not get the model, she becomes to be a black box adversary. For
some face authentication systems with network, they do not come
with an embedding model inside. They use online model instead,
mainly due to intelligence property protection to the model, which
makes directly extracting the model out impossible. But in this
case, the attacker still can use the model to acquire embeddings
for her photos, if only she could make clear the API of the online
embedding service, which requires much less reversing engineering
work, comparing with the white box case. Besides, we found some
systems employ public online face embedding service providers like
Clarifai. They can be easily identified by the IP addresses of their
servers. In this case, attackers can directly use the online model as
a black box.
A black box adversary can bootstrap to a white box adversary,
by training a substitutional model. As we noticed that some model
recovery method requires only query to a model but can work out
a model that has a similar functionality as the imitated one. The
most straightforward method is model distillation [10], which was
originally used to compress a large model to be a smaller one, but
was used as a tool to learn AI models in a lot of black box scenarios.
No Box Adversaries. In some cases, the adversary has no any
access to the model, or even the system itself. In this case, the
adversary has no way to map the <photo, distance> list to <em-
bedding, distance> list, which may causes troubles for the attack.
However, as we will later show, the embedding spaces of different
embedding models have parallel relationship in some extent, which
means attackers can work out an embedding in her designated
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embedding space by using her own model instead of the one used
to calculate the distance. Therefore, attackers can still recover the
victim image using our method.
4 EMBEDDING RECOVERY
In this section, we show that how embeddings can be worked out
by attackers with only distance information leaked by the authenti-
cation system.
4.1 Distances Leakage
The calculated distance, from some developers’ perspective, is not
sensitive, according to our observation in a lot of cases. An example
we encountered is a self-service machine that was deployed at the
Chinese entry and exit bureau (the counterpart of immigration or
boarder inspection of some countries, and also part of the police sys-
tem). This machine authenticates users with their faces before they
can touch later functions. To use this machine, a user need firstly
enter his ID number and then stare at the camera for face authen-
tication. However, the machine directly displays the similarity on
the screen (see Figure. 1a), which allow attackers to directly know
the distance. We also found some apps with face authentication
functions make similar mistakes. An app uses face as ID directly
shows the matching score on the UI to users, as shown by Figure.1b.
No matter if similarity, score or confidence level displayed, they are
eventually variant of embedding distance, through which attackers
can acquire the distance.
To make clear the reason that developers leak distances, we dis-
cussed with five AI system developers. Unfortunately, none of them
believed the distance is sensitive. What’s worse is that one devel-
oper among the five believed that displaying the distance to users is
necessary, because he thinks the similarity helps system managers
better deploy and debug the system. Specifically, he told us that face
authentication systems, especially the systems developed a couple
of years ago, had poor success rate. The success rate can hardly
be satisfied when firstly installed on a self service machine. The
manager needs to know the real time image and confidence level
to infer and handle possible factors that fails legal users’ authen-
tication, like the ambient light, irregular shadows etc.He suspects
that such system deployed at complex environment must show the
similarity.
4.2 Get Embedding with Distance
Embeddings can be recovered from distances. As we identi-
fied, if only an attacker acquires enough number of distances to a
sensitive embedding, the embedding can be recovered.
Let us consider the simplest occasion. Assuming that there is
an unknown point p0 (an embedding with two dimensions) in a
2D plane, if only other two points (p1 and p2) and their distances
(d1 and d2) to the point p0 are known, the coordinates of p0 can be
worked out, because p0 must be located at the intersection of two
circles: One centered in p1 with radius d1, another centered at p2
with radius d2. Intersection of two circles can be either two points
or one point or just no intersection. Because we already know that
at least p0 is in the intersection, there can be either one point or
two points in the intersection. As a result, if only p1, p2, d1 and d2
are known, the p0 is definitely also known, with at most one false
candidate, as shown by Figure. 2
Given that a n-D embedding is used by the system, once distances
to other n embeddings are known, the embedding is definitely leaked.
As for the reason, embeddings are points in high dimensional space.
The only difference between embeddings and 2D points is that
embeddings are of higher dimension. Later we show how the at-
tacker can work out an unknown embedding with n distances and
corresponding embeddings.
Solve equation to recover embeddings. Every time an attacker
knows a distance to the embedding, she knows that the embed-
ding is on a (n-1)-sphere. When she accumulated some different
distances, she knows that the embedding is on the intersection of
them. From the perspective of algebra, she gets an equation about
the embedding for each (n-1)-sphere and the embedding is just the
root of the equation system (shown by equation system .1), where ®x
is the unknown embedding, ®xi and di being the known embeddings
and their distances to ®x .
| | ®x − ®x1 | | = d21
| | ®x − ®x2 | | = d22
... (1)
| | ®x − ®xn | | = d2n
Embedding systems usually use either cosine distance or Eu-
clidean (L2) distance. Specifically, for embedding systems that are
evaluated with L2 distance, the equation set the attacker needs to
solve turns to equation. 2. The only obstacle to a success recovery is
that how many roots the system has. If equation. 2 has and only has
few (like one or two) roots like the n = 2 (circle) case, the embed-
ding can be recovered by directly solving the equation. However, if
the equation has like O(poly(n)) roots, the attacker still need more
hard work, because she does not know which one is the embedding
among these roots.
®x⊺ · ®x +A · ®x + D = 0 (2)
where
A = −2 · { ®x1, ®x2, ..., ®xn }⊺
D = { ®x1⊺ · ®x1 − d21 , ®x2⊺ · ®x2 − d22 , ..., ®xn⊺ · ®xn − d2n }⊺
As we will later show, equation. 2 has at most 2 different roots
and at least one root, indicating that attackers can readily recover
the embedding.
To know how many different possible embeddings attackers will
have with n distances, we firstly check how many roots equation. 3
has. Because it is an ordinary linear equation system, it has only
one root (shown by equation. 4) given that all ®xi are linearly inde-
pendent (normally, two embeddings won’t be parallel) and z is a
newly introduced constant that is independent of ®x . If the root of
equation 3 wants to be also the root of equation. 2, it needs also
satisfy equation. 5, as equation. 3 becomes to equation. 2 if only
z is replaced by ®x⊺ · ®x . However, such z has only up to two roots,
as equation. 5 is an ordinary quadratic equation about z which is
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(a) An self-service desk in Chinese entry & exit bureau. (b) A Face ID app.
Figure 1: Scenarios distances are leaked.
d1
p1
d2
p2
Possible p0
Possible p0
Figure 2: Illustration of two distances determine an embed-
ding
a scalar. As a result, ®x can also have up to two roots, as shown by
equation. 6.
z +A · ®x + D = 0 (3)
®x = −A−1 · (D + z) (4)
z = ®x⊺ · ®x (5)
= D⊺BD + z · ®1⊺BD + z · D⊺B · ®1 + z2 · ®1⊺B · ®1
where
B = (A−1)⊺ · A−1
®1 = {1, 1, ..., 1}⊺︸         ︷︷         ︸
n 1s
®x = −A−1 · (D + −b ±
√
b2 − 4ac
2a ) (6)
where
a = ®1⊺B · ®1
b = ®1⊺BD + ·D⊺B · ®1 − 1
c = D⊺BD
Specifically for embedding systems with cosine distance as the
metric, things are similar. Equation. 8 tells an attacker how to
calculate the embedding when she hasn different distances, because
the embedding must satisfy equation .7. In this case, the norm of
the embedding gets lost, but the norm of embedding in cosine
embedding systems is useless because two parallel embeddings will
be regarded as exactly the same. One can directly normalize the
embedding.
A · ®x| ®x | = D (7)
®x
| ®x | = A
−1 · D (8)
where
A = { ®x1| ®x1 | ,
®x2
| ®x2 | , ...,
®xn
| ®xn | }
⊺
D = {1 − d1, 1 − d2, 1 − dn }⊺
In a word, when an attacker has accumulated n distances to an
embedding, she can always recover the embedding, no matter if
the embedding is in Euclidean system or cosine system.
4.3 Dimension Reduction
We consider how attackers can recover the embedding when less
than n distances can be acquired. As we noticed, the dimension
size n can be huge for some embedding schemes, which makes
the attack too long to succeed. Nonetheless, the entropy a piece
of embedding actually contains is far less than that a n dimension
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vector can contain. Therefore, the attacker may possibly recover
the embedding even less than n distances collected.
Firstly, we make clear why the actual information inside a piece
of embedding is far less than the volume of the vector. We care-
fully reviewed the facenet embedding scheme [18] and found that
the number of dimensions does not influence much on the accu-
racy. Specifically, the 128 dimension embedding scheme has only 1
percent advantage over the 64 dimension scheme. Besides, larger
embeddings including 256 and 512 dimensions both results in worse
accuracy, indicating that a 64 dimension vector can already well
accommodate all the information the neural network extracts. An-
other reason resulting in the information sparsity is that the use
of dropout [21] in CNN training. To avoid over-fitting, developers
intentionally and randomly shut off some neurons during a train-
ing iteration, which encourages the network to behave similarly
in different neurons. As a result, the outputs of different neurons
would be similar. Therefore, the output of a network layer has a lot
of redundancy.
Second, we investigate how much entropy a piece of embedding
actually contains. We calculated facenet-128 embeddings for 400
randomly selected images from the LFW dataset. Then we launched
PCA over these embeddings with SVD. The 400 embeddings were
regarded as row vectors and put into a matrix (M) row by row for
SVD and PCA. Figure.3a shows the distance between embeddings
inM and their PCAed ones in M˜ at different ranks. As we can see,
when the rank reaches 33, the distance goes below 0.1 which is
totally negligible, considering that the threshold for differentiating
people is often set to over 1.2. In other words, we can use a 33 di-
mensional vector to represent a 128 dimensional embedding nearly
losslessly.
Third, we upgrade themethod in Section 4.2 to allow it workwith
less distance observations, with the help of SVD and our finding
that embeddings are of low entropy. Given that an attacker hasm
distance observations instead of n that is the number of dimensions
of an embedding, the attacker can still construct the equation. 2.
However, she cannot solve the equation because the equation obvi-
ously has infinite roots. The equation helps the attacker to know
that the embedding is in a high dimensional manifold but cannot
help her get the exact coordinate.
Considering that embeddings are of low entropy, we assume that
rank m is enough for representing any embedding. Therefore, a
n dimension embedding e has negligible distance from its PCAed
version, i.e. , we can regard e = em · Σm · V ⊺m + δ in which em
ism dimensional, Σm beingm-by-m, Vm being n-by-m and |δ | far
less than |e |. Therefore, equation. 2 turns to equation. 9, given that
®x = ( ®˜x⊺ · Σm ·V ⊺m )⊺ +δ , where ®˜x is am dimensional column vector
and ∆ being the result of δ which is negligible (|∆| ≪ |D |) because
δ is negligible.
®˜x⊺ · Σm ·V ⊺m ·Vm · Σm · ®˜x +A ·Vm · Σm · ®˜x + D + ∆ = 0 (9)
Surprisingly, equation. 9 now can only have up to two roots,
considering that there are onlym variables ( ®˜x ) but the rank of any
matrix does not exceedm (V ⊺m ·Vm is am-by-m identity matrix and
A ·Vm alsom-by-m). The method to solve equation. 9 is very similar
to equation. 2 and the root of equation. 9 is shown by equation.10
if we neglect ∆. As you may find, ®x here has exactly the same
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Figure 3: Error distance for PCA and for recovery method
based on SVD
form with equation. 6 (No more SVD matrices involved), with ®x =
( ®˜x⊺ · Σm · V ⊺m )⊺ put in. The only difference between the root of
equation. 2 and that of ®x in equation. 9 is that A−1 now refers to
the pseudo inverse of A.
®˜x = −Σ−1m ·V −1m · A−1 · (D +
−b ±
√
b2 − 4ac
2a ) (10)
This suggests the attacker that she can use equation. 6 to work
out the embedding with negligible error directly even when not
enough distances collected, if only the number of distances is larger
than the rank required for PCA the embeddings with satisfied
quality. Besides, the more distances collected, the less the error
would be.
To verify that such method indeed works, we used the method
to recover 300 embeddings randomly selected from the aforemen-
tioned 400 LFW images with some of the images selected from the
rest 100 to query distances. Figure. 3b shows the recovery error
against the number of distances the attacker can get. As we can see,
when the attacker has more than 53 distances, the recovery error
can drop to below 0.1 which is negligible.
However, by comparing Figure. 3a and Figure. 3b, we find that
the error distance is slightly larger than that got by PCA when
the number of distances is exactly the rank of SVD. Theoretically,
the recovery loss totally stems from δ that is a result of PCA error.
Nonetheless, when solving equation. 9, ∆ is treated as zero, which
makes the root of ®˜x slightly deviated. Therefore, the error of the
recovered embedding consists of two parts: 1) PCA error which is
a result of neglecting non-principal components; 2) Root deviation
that is a result of neglecting the deviation made by the PCA error to
the equation. As a consequence, for a given error cap, the attacker
needs more distances than the number of rank.
For the higher dimension face scheme in the facenet family, the
required number of distances does not increase. After having re-
covered embeddings with facenet-512, we found higher dimension
schemes even converges faster. For the facecet-512 scheme, it costs
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the attacker only 39 distances to drop the average error distance
below to 0.063 (10% of the threshold, see Table. 1.) We believe it
is because embedding models with better accuracy in fact extract
features better. Therefore less orthogonal features are needed to
achieve the same accuracy. More dimensions are a result of anti-
over-fitting.
4.4 No-box assumption
The method in Section. 4.2 does not work with no box assumption.
The method uses embeddings of the query images to construct
matrix A, which can be done by either generating by the attacker
herself or querying the embedding model with white box or black
box assumptions. However, with our no box assumption, the at-
tacker even does not know what embedding model the system uses.
As a result, the attacker cannot prepare matrix A for the recovery
method and thereby cannot launch the attack.
A distance calculated in one embedding domain may be applied
to another embedding domain. Given that the authentication system
uses an embedding model E to generate embeddings, a distance
(d) the attacker gets thereby is calculated with the E embeddings
of two images. Imagine in another embedding system, say E ′, the
distance d ′ of the same two images would be calculated with their
E ′ embeddings. Because E and E ′ in fact do the same thing though
are trained with different models, we believe the distances for the
same given pair of images under these two embedding domain have
large similarity, i.e. f (d) ≈ d ′, where f (·) is a linear mapping to
fix output range. In other words, when E thinks a pair of faces are
similar, E ′ has high chances to agree with it, and vice-versa.
Based on this assumption, the attacker can solve the equation
in another embedding space. For example, the attacker does not
know what model an authentication system uses but still gets a list
of distances with a list of face images. She just arbitrarily calculates
the facenet-128 embeddings of the images and directly uses the
acquired distances to solve equation. 2. Then she gets a facenet-128
embedding and believes it is equal to the facenet-128 embedding of
the victim image.
We also evaluated the performance of the embedding recov-
ery with the no box assumption. We assume the authentication
system uses facenet-512 model to generate embeddings and calcu-
lates distance while the attacker uses facenet-128 model to recover
the embedding for 200 victim image from LFW. To be noticed is
that facenet-128 and facenet-512 are totally different embedding
schemes: they use L2 and cosine distance respectively and are
trained on different data sets (see Table. 1). In this case, the em-
beddings the attacker can recover are facenet-128 embeddings. We
show the average distance errors from the recovered ones to the
facenet-128 embeddings of the original images, and also show the
ratio the recovered ones can be regarded as from the victim using
a stricter threshold (1.2). Figure. 4 shows the results.
Different from Figure. 3, where the error distance decreases with
increasing number of distances the attacker uses, Figure. 4 shows
an decreasing first and then increasing trend. The optimal point
lies in 33, which means attackers can have least error distance with
33 distances collected for one victim. As for the reason, we believe
it is because the distance in fact comes with errors resulted from
the different embedding systems. The PCA scheme guarantees that
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Figure 4: Average error distance and the rate of acceptance
versus different number of distances the attacker uses
more components involved and less error would be. Therefore, more
distances lead to less error. However, the distance the attacker gets
actually is not the distance in the attacker’s embedding domain, but
borrowed from the authentication system’s, which is only a kind
of approximation. As a result, every distance brings in information
about the victim embedding but also noises simultaneously. Before
the optimal, each distance cancels more SVD losses while after the
optimal, the added principal components provide less distance gain
than the noises, the error distance therefore increases.
With this trick, the no-box assumption turns to white box as-
sumption. The only consequences are that 1) The embedding the
attacker gets is not of the original type but the attacker’s own type.
2) The corresponding image may be regarded as another image of
the victim.
5 EMBEDDING RECOVERY MODEL
In this section, we introduce the recovery framework we designed.
The recovery method can help attackers convert the embeddings
the attacker acquired in Section. 4 to a profile image of the victim.
5.1 Overview
Inspired by GAN and VAE (Variational Auto Encoder), we designed
the framework shown by Figure. 5. The framework mainly consists
of a brand new embedding to image generator, a discriminator and
several loss functions.
We assumed that the attacker owns a bunch of images to train
our recovery model (denoted as R), which can be acquired from
public face data sets. These images are firstly converted to face
embeddings with the same type as the embedding to be handled
(denoted as Mt ). For black and white assumptions, Mt refers to
the model the authentication system uses to calculate embeddings.
As the assumptions already assumes the attacker can query any
image for its embedding, this step can be done straightforwardly.
For no-box attackers,Mt refers to the model the attacker used in
Section. 4.4.
The embeddings instead of randomly generatednoises are
sent to the generator, which is the main difference from ordinary
GAN framework and also a key innovation of our work. The genera-
tor generates images for each input embedding. Then the generated
images (IMG_g) are sent to different modules for loss generation.
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Figure 5: Overview of the GAN-like recovery framework.
The generated images are used for generating three kinds of loss:
discriminator loss, recovery loss and embedding loss. The three
loss items are then used to direct updating the generator.
5.2 Generator
The generator does not follow classical GAN generator design. We
also tried to fit classical structures to the problem setting but found
none performed well.
Noise Label
Generator
Output Plane
Noise
Random Images
Generator
Conditional GAN GAN
Embedding
Corresponded 
Face Image
Generator
Our Generator
Corresponded
Figure 6: Comparison of Conditional GAN generator, GAN
generator and our generator.
The generator takes embeddings as input instead of noises be-
cause in our case, we expect the model to have generalization
capability over embeddings. Ordinary GANs have generalization
capability over noise field, but does not limit the output, resulting
in meaningful but not controlled images. However, in our setting,
we need the generated images exactly corresponding to their input
embeddings. Conditional GAN (cGAN) has generalization capabil-
ity over noise field under the constraint of the label. If we regard
embeddings as labels, cGAN indeed can make output correspond-
ing to embeddings. However, cGAN has no generality on label,
meaning that it can only generate images with seen labels, which
does not satisfy our requirement. In contrast to GAN family, our
generator has generalization over embeddings and also output cor-
responded face images. Figure. 6 illustrates the difference between
our generator and the generator of the other two mentioned GANs.
The generator we designed has two phases: multi path phase
and single-path phase. Figure. 7 shows the design of our generator
for 512 dimension embedding input. The first phase, i.e. multi path
phase tries to extract information from the input embedding in dif-
ferent paces, aiming at adapting embeddings generated by models
of different types. For our 512 dimension embedding recovery case,
the rapid branch directly deconvolutes the embedding from 512
dimension to 512 10*10 tiny images. In contrast, the mild branch
firstly deconvolutes it into 2*2 and then 10*10. The different paces
result in different grade information extraction. These branches are
then combined together after they reach the same size, providing a
unified processing method for the later phase. The second phase,
single path phase, generates gradually clearer and larger images by
concentrating channels. The data repeatedly passes deconvolution
unit following by a residual convolution unit (Figure. 8). The de-
convolution unit enlarges the generated images by fusing multiple
channels, during which the size of the images is doubled while the
channels halved, followed by the residual unit which rectifies the
images without changing the image size.
5.3 Recovery Loss
To encourage the generator generate images corresponding to
their embeddings, we add a loss item forcing the generated im-
age (IMG_g) similar to the original image (IMG). The loss penalizes
the model according to the difference between IMG and IMG_g.
Equation. 11 shows the recovery loss.
Lr = | |IMG − IMGд | |1 (11)
Here we use L1 norm to measure the loss instead of L2 because
we found L2 pays more attention to background comparing with L1.
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Figure 8: Residual structure used in the generator.
L2 cares more about larger difference while usually the background
part varies more from one image to another than the face part of
an image.
5.4 Embedding Loss
To better stimulate the generator to recover corresponded images,
we also seek help from face embedding models. We deliver the
generated images (IMG_g) to a face embedding model (denoted as
Me ) to get their embeddings (Emb_g). We introduce the embedding
loss (L_e) to penalize the difference between the embedding of the
input images and the embedding of the generated images, as shown
by equation. 12. The type of norm used by Le depends on the norm
the face embedding model chooses, as it describes the difference
between embeddings best.
Le = | |Me (IMG) −Me (IMGд)| | (12)
For the white box and no-box assumptions, attackers can readily
useMt asMe . However, an black box attacker can only queryMt
while the gradients that are required for training are missing there.
In other words, given x0 and f (x0), attackers has no way to know
f ′(x0) which are necessary for instructing the training optimizer.
In this case, Le can be directly set to constant 0.
To also allow black box adversaries to experience the assistance
from embedding loss, an attacker can either 1) train a substitutional
model asMe or 2) use an open source model instead.
For the first case, attackers can employ the teaching-student
method[10] to construct a model from the embeddings and images
such that the model has approximately the same behaviour with
the Mt . Thus, with x0 to xn and f (x0) to f (xn ), the attacker can
train a model д such that д(x0) to д(xn ) are all approximately equal
to f (x0) to f (xn ). Then the attacker can use д to substitute the f
asMe to get gradients and direct the updating, expecting that д′ is
also an approximation to f ′.
For the second, if only a model д is also a face embedding model,
the model д can be used to measure the quality of the generated
images, though it may have utterly different characteristics from
the original model f . The attacker can expect an open source model
to help evaluate the similarity between a generated images and
the original training image. Thus, they expect | |д(x1) −д(x2)| | with
some positive relationship with | | f (x1) − f (x2)| |.
MultipleMe can be used together to get better quality. Because
of the over-fitting characteristics of deep learning models, it is
expected that one face embedding model focuses on some kinds
of features on the input. By combining multiple different models,
they can learn more features to better weight the quality loss.
5.5 Discriminator
The discriminator guarantees that the generated images indeed
look like images containing faces.
The discriminator we employed follow the standard discrimina-
tor from WGAN-GP. The loss is directly used as our discriminator
loss(Ld ). WGAN-GP needs to maintain Lipschitz function to cal-
culate the Wasserstein distance. It penalizes gradient for every
independent sample. The discriminator we use also drops all batch
normalization layers (BN), and after every convolutional operation,
we add a small Residual Block just like our generator. In the end, the
output of the discriminator will be a scalar that is the confidence
the discriminator thinks the input is real.
5.6 Training Process
We follow the GAN training process to train our model, i.e. training
generator and discriminator in turn. When training the generator,
3:1:1 to 2:1:1 was found to be the best ratio for Lr , Ld and Le . Learn-
ing rate is decayed 0.02 for every epoch. We train the generator
five times after every single discriminator training iteration.
6 EVALUATION
We evaluate the recovery model we designed in this section. To
understand how much risk the recovered embeddings result in, we
show the images recovered from the recovered face embeddings.
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6.1 Target Embedding Model
We have chosen four face embedding models as our targetMt . They
are a self trained Inception Resnet, Clarifai online face embedding
model, the current version Facenet and an old version but more
well-known Facenet model.
Model Emb.Length
Distance
Type TH Acc.
Residual
Inception Network 1792 Cosine 0.78 92.1%
Clarifai Online
Face Embedding [3] 1024 Cosine 0.55 98.1%
Facenet
20180402-114759 512 Cosine 0.63 97.6%
1
Facenet
20170512-110547 128 L2
2 1.28 97.1%3
Table 1: Target models. TH is the threshold themodel would
regard two embeddings from the same person. Acc. is the
accuracy under the threshold we set.
Self trained Resnet model. To evaluate recovery quality for the
case that the target authentication system uses a self-trained model,
we tried to train a model with little hard work, which is what
developers of small enterprises with ML demand do. We trained
the model with popular network structure on an open face dataset.
The structure we chose is inception-resnet-v1, the training dataset
is CASIA-Webface, and the test dataset being LFW dataset. We
added cross-entroy loss over the “Additive Margin Softmax” after
densing the embedding, which turns the model to a classifier for
training. Because the model was trained with dense as classifier, the
embedding can be measured by cosine distance. The model got only
moderate accuracy as no fancy Deep learning tricks were added,
which imitates small enterprise models.
Online Model.Mainly to test if our recovery model can recover
images under a pure black box adversary assumption, we add to
our target list a totally black box face embedding model, i.e. online
model. we surveyed popular online face embedding models and
found Clarifai the most popular one4. Clarifai provides almost all
platform SDKs to allow developers directly access their server for
embedding generation, during which the model is never exposed
to developers.
Facenet. Facenet[18] is the first well-known work for face em-
bedding, as its triplet loss greatly improved face embedding per-
formance. Facenet also is the most popular open source face em-
bedding work5. The most popular implementation of Facenet was
found at[17]6. According to the history of the git page, the author
1We used dlib as alignment tool, which resulted in lower accuracy than that shown on
git.
2Facenet required squared L2. we use L2 instead, as they are equivalent for comparing
only.
3We used dlib as alignment tool, which resulted in lower accuracy than the that shown
on git.
4Clarifai ranked the first when Google searching “Face Embedding API”.
5Facenet ranked the first when Google searching “Face Embedding”.
6It appeared next to the paper of Facenet when searching “Facenet” on Google.
published two 128 dimension face embedding model and recently
updated to the 512 dimension version. We evaluate on both the cur-
rent 512 Dimension model and one of the previous 128 Dimension
model.
6.2 Evaluation Metric
To confirm if the recovery model (R) generated images indeed look
like embedding owners, we introduce a judger modelMj to measure
the distance between the original images and the generated images,
and use the distance to quantify privacy leakage extent. Specifically,
we hire Facenet-512 model as the judgerMj . If the distance is below
the commonly used threshold (0.63 for our evaluation), we regard
the recovery quality loss acceptable and say a successful attack.
Besides, we also recruited five volunteers to subjectively rate the
similarities between original face images and the recovered images,
in case the model generates images solely cheatingMj .
6.3 Experiment Setup
We set up a platform (Table. 2) to run all the following evaluation
experiment.
CPU Core i9-9900k
Memory 64G
GPU 2080Ti 11G
Platform Tensorflow 1.10
Table 2: Experiment environment for evaluation.
We use most of images of LFW (12000) to train the recovery
model (R) while the left 384 images were used for testing. The time
consumed to train a recovery model is around 10 - 13 hours. Before
evaluating the recovery model, we firstly get the embeddings of
testing images. The testing images are firstly sent to our recov-
ery method in Section. 4.2 for recovery. Unsurprisingly, there is
no recovery error encountered (less than eps). Then we use the
recovered embeddings to evaluate the recovery model.
To be noticed is that we have up to three models involved in a
single training: 1) The target model Mt , 2) Me , the model for Le
generation; 3) the judger modelMj which is set to facenet-512 in
our evaluation.
6.4 Pure Black Box Recovery
We evaluated all the fourMt under the black box adversary assump-
tion. For the three models which eventually we have the details
about the models, we set the embedding loss (Le ) to constant as if
attackers do not know the model but train our recovery model.
Evaluation Result. As we can see from Table. 3, the recovery
model trained for the Facenet-128 dimension model got the best
overall recovery performance, while got the worst for the Clarifai
model. The recovery quality for the two Facenet models are nearly
perfect, though are less surprising for the other two.
Table. 4 (column 2 to 5 for black box assumption) shows some
recovered samples for each model, which indicates similar conclu-
sion. For the cases with best recovery quality, i.e. Facenet 512D and
7Clarifai failed to return embeddings for some LFW images, so only 250 images were
left for testing
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Target Model SuccessRate
Avg. Q.
Loss
Avg.
Q. Rating
Avg.
S. Rating
Wide Residual
Inception Network 62.76% 0.5901 3.9 3.7
Clarifai Online
Face Embedding 58.00%
7 0.5987 3.8 4.0
Facenet
20180402-114759 92.19% 0.4186 4.5 4.6
Facenet
20170512-110547 93.75% 0.4135 4.6 4.6
Table 3: Black box evaluation result. Avg. Q. Loss is the av-
erage distance between a generated image and the original
image. Q. Rating (Quality Rating) is the subjective rate for
quality while S. Rating (Similarity Rating) is the subjective
rating for similarity between generated and original.
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Figure 9: Probability Density Function of distances between
embeddings of the same person, different people and {origi-
nal, recovered} images respectively. The vertical line shows
the threshold for the Facenet 512D model to regard as the
same person.
128D, the recovered images clearly show faces that can be affirma-
tively regarded as another version of the victim. Even for the worst
case, i.e. Clarifai, there are still considerable similarities between
the recovered and original, indicating huge privacy threaten to
embedding owners.
Subjective rating also goes with the quality metric. Our volun-
teers agreed that the recovered images against the two Facenet
models have high fidelity and most (over 90%) of them can be
thought as real photos taken for their owners.
Distance Distribution. A recovered image can be regarded as
another photo of the embedding owner, from the perspective of
similarity. Figure. 9 shows the distribution of distances between
two images from the same person, two images from different people
and the pair of original and recovered images. As we can see, the
threshold line can clearly tell apart the distances of the same person
(left, smaller) and different people (right, larger). However, the
distance between original images and recovered images has a nearly
identical distribution with that of the same person, indicating that
a recovered image can be regarded as from the embedding owner.
Recovery Performance vs embedding length. The recovery
quality has nearly no correlation with embedding length, which
goes with our PCA experiment conclusion.
Recovery Quality vs Accuracy. The recovery performance nei-
ther has strong correlation with embedding model accuracy. It is
believed that better recognition accuracy is a result of richer infor-
mation delivered by embeddings. Similarly, the richer information
can result in better recovery quality. The results showed that this
is not always true. The recovery for online Clarifai model has rela-
tively poorer quality while this model has very high recognition
accuracy. Except the Clarifai case, the rest three models approxi-
mately follow this rule. Facenet models have both better recognition
accuracy and recovery quality than the self trained resnet model.
We still believe the recovery quality depends on target embed-
ding model’s accuracy. We analyzed Clarifai online model and
found that, though the model yield a very high recognition accu-
racy, the distance between two embeddings from different people
is still pretty low. Specifically, distance from different people and
distance from the same person have close absolute value, though
they have clear boundary so they can be told apart from each other.
We believe this is the reason of relatively lower quality for the high
accuracy model. Besides, we have no idea if Clarifai model was
trained with LFW. We are sure that the other three models have
never seen our data to train the recovery model, i.e. LFW. However
we have no any knowledge about Clarifai model’s training process.
So, it is possible that LFW was also used as part of their training
data, which later interfered our training process, as training data
are always over-fitting points of the model (it will later be discussed
in another scenario).
From another perspective, we believe the difficulties for recov-
ering embeddings of different models are different. Embedding
models’ capabilities to describe mappings are different, some are
of higher while some are of lower. Usually, embedding model with
higher describing capability results in higher recognition accuracy.
While our recovery model only has limited capability to describe
mapping. If the target model is so strong (higher accuracy) such
that the recover model does not have enough capability to describe
its inverse mapping, the recovery quality would be low. In this case,
attacker need employ a stronger generator to deal with the model.
6.5 Recovering Training Data
Usually people do not care prediction quality on training data.
However we still evaluated the recovery quality on training data
of theMt , because we found there are chances that ML developers
devote later collected user data to fine tune their model. As a result,
user data which originally were test data become training data.
We used 1472 images from CASIA-WEB database (the training
data of Facenet 512 model) and tested its recovery quality on the
recovery model (R) for the Facenet 512 model we got in section.
6.4. Surprisingly, the success rate 88.18% is even lower than that on
unseen test data (92.19%).
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Original Facenet128D
Facenet
512D
Clarifai
Online Model
Self Trained
Model
Substitutional
Model Assisted White Box
Table 4: Recovered samples during evaluation.
We conjecture this is because the training data is too over-fitting
forMt . Specifically, forMt , the distribution of training data’s em-
bedding and that of unseen data’s embedding actually are slightly
different. However, our recovery model is trained with data that
are never seen by Mt , resulting in misleading and inappropriate
inverse mapping description onMt ’s training data. As a result, our
recovery model is not that suitable to recoverMt ’s training data.
6.6 Substitutional Model Assisted Black Box
We simulated a black box adversary who uses an open source model
asMe to assist her recovery model training.
We take the latest Facenet implementation, i.e. Facenet 512D,
asMt . When training the recovery model, we use the old version
Facenet 128D model asMe .
As we can see from Table. 5, the success rate and quality both
increased, with the assistance of an old version model .
We believe the most important factor for the improvement is
model diversity. With a different model supervising the image gen-
eration, it is more possible that the generator can generate images
with less defects, given that every embedding model may neglect
Evaluation
Method Suc. Rate
Suc.
Inc. Q. Loss Q. Inc.
Substitutional
Model Assisted 94.53% 2.54% 0.4149 0.89%
Training
Data Recovery 88.18% 0.4727
White Box 91.41% 0.4340
Table 5: Evaluation results of substitutional model assisted
black box scenario, training data recovery andwhite box sce-
nario.
some important feature of the input image which may be taken
care by another model. It is possible that if even more models
are added to supervise the generator training (by adding multiple
Le of different model) process, the generator can perform better.
However we also noticed that GPU memory may not be able to ac-
commodate more models. We cannot even successfully put a 128D
Facenet model to assist our generator for the 1024D and 1792D
model, because of GPU memory limitation. We believe GPUs with
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more memory may help attackers achieve multiple model assisted
training.
6.7 White Box Recovery
We also evaluated recovery quality under the white box assump-
tion. We trained the recovery model for Facenet 512D with Le
constructed also by Facenet 512D.
Unfortunately, we ended up with a even worse results than black
box model, as shown by Table. 5. It goes contrary with our common
sense. Usually we believe a model works better under white box
model because more information is given. The only explanation
we can find is that recovery model prone to over-fitting if it is
also supervised by the target model (Mt asMe ). This explanation
is coincide to the performance improvement in Section. 6.6 and
Section.6.5. The generator already exploited the mapping from em-
bedding to image, while the opinion of another model as embedding
loss actually corrects some points neglected by the target model.
However, the neglected part would be impressed if the same model
again interfere the mapping learning.
Considering the observation, a white box attacker would better
hire another model to assist recovery model training.
7 RELATEDWORKS
Papernot et al. surveyed [16] security and privacy issues around ML
from nearly all aspects. However, our work cannot be categorized
according to the survey. According to their survey, privacy issues
during inference mainly result in three attacks: membership infer-
ence, training data extraction and model extraction. Apparently,
our work cannot be simply put into any among the three. We list
some very relevant works for further reference.
7.1 Training Data Security
Fredrikson et al. showed in [4] that part of training data can be
reconstructed given confidence values revealed along with pre-
dictions. Specifically for their face recognition study, they recon-
structed meaningful images of a victim who is in the training set.
Besides, given a blurred image of a training image, an attacker can
identify the victim from the training set or determine that the im-
ages owner is not in the training set. The work is an extension from
their previous work [5] which proposed the model inversion attack.
Generically, Reza et al. proposed a quantitative investigation on
information leakage by machine learning models [20]. They specif-
ically focus on membership inference problem which determines
if a record is in the training set of a given model. Nasr et al. pro-
posed a method to protect membership privacy using adversarial
regularization [14].
Under the framework of differential privacy, Abadi et al. devel-
oped new techniques to train model with differential privacy on
training data [1]
To protect training data when multiple parties should jointly
learn a model, Reza et al. proposed a kind of collaborative learning
framework that enable them to learn an accurate model without
sharing training data [19]. However, Hitaj et al. showed that even in
collaborative learning scenarios, attackers can still recover training
data at some extent, mainly by utilizing GAN.
To be noticed is that our work is working on another track
comparing with these works, though we all targets recovering
data related to ML models. Training data can be recovered from
models mainly because ML models usually have very large gradient
or special featured gradient resulted from over-fitting at training
points. While our work focuses on recovering unseen data in which
these characteristics are missing.
7.2 Model Security
Tramer et al. proposed [22] a method to extract ML models in the
ML-as-a-service scenario, indicating that models can be readily
stolen by attackers if only queries is allowed toward a model. Apart
from models, hyper-parameters are also investigated and found
likely to be stolen [23]. Oh et al. showed that even optimization
procedure can be inferred [15].
Besides through querying, researchers proposed to infer the
model structure through running traces, Naghibijouybari et al.
showed that performance counters collected during GPU running
can be used to infer model hyper-parameters [13]. Besides perfor-
mance counter, cache is another source for model inference [11, 24].
Hanzlik et al. developed MLCapsule, aiming at preventing model
stealing or reverse engineering while keeping user input locally
stored[9].
8 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss some potential countermeasures to em-
bedding leakages and also some possible future work directions.
8.1 Defense
Better Developer Education. ML library and SDK documenta-
tions should clearly tell developers that distances can only be ex-
posed to authorized managers and can never be displayed to normal
users. Developers should also learn case studies about embedding
leakages so they will not leak distances inadvertently.
One-way Model. Just like one-way hash function, ML developers
may design models in a style that the reverse mapping of a model
cannot be easily worked out by attackers. Hash functions employ
computation subroutines that are hardly to reverse. However, basic
units used byMLmodels today, like pooling, convolution, activation,
are all partially or totally reversible, resulting in reversible models.
We hope ML developers could design model structures that cannot
be easily reversed.
Ideas from protecting models, like [9], can also be borrowed to
make the model irreversible.
Introducing Noises. Inspired by VAE, we propose adding to em-
beddings noises, such that the accuracy of using embeddings does
not decrease sharply while the image recovery turns to be of low
quality.
VAE usually produces images that are obviously dimmer, which
is because of distributions rather than determined numbers are
produced by the encoder. As a result, to tolerate the variances
(noises), the decoder produces dimmer images comparing with
GAN.
We suspect an embedding with noises may similarly results in
lower recovery quality. Therefore, ML developers may intentionally
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add noises to embeddings before comparing images. As a result,
leaked embeddings can only help attackers produce vague images.
8.2 Future Work
Better GAN. Our work employs a GAN like structure to gener-
ate images. The recovery quality can be largely improved if more
advanced techniques in GAN can be borrowed. The borrowed dis-
criminator is still far from perfect as for some models the images
generated still comewith defects and damage.ML professionalsmay
re-design the structure so the recovery quality can be improved.
Quantifying information on embedding. There are differen-
tial privacy works targeting quantitatively measuring information
leakages on a published model. It’s also valuable to construct a
framework to evaluate the carried information on distances, with
which we can know the upper bound of potential leakage related
to embeddings.
9 CONCLUSION
The face similarity, which looks like insensitive, is displayed to
users in some scenarios. Our work demonstrate that face similarity
actually contains rich information about the user. Once dozens of
such similarities acquired by an attacker, she can readily recover
the embedding of the victim face, with our proposed embedding
recovery equations. What’s worse is that the embedding is equally
sensitive as the victim face. To support this point, we designed a
GAN like recovery model that converts the recovered embedding
back to face images. The recovery quality is good as most of the
recovered images can be regarded as from the victim from the
perspective of the judger model. We call the community to pay
attention to the unobserved leakage and pushes developers to avoid
such leakages in the future.
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